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1. Is children’s naming and drawing of pictures mediated by representational intentions? 
Evidence from typical development and autism. 
 Pictures are symbols for entities that exist independently in time and space. Because 
they are intended to symbolise real objects, it is the cultural norm to assign object names to 2-
dimensional representations (i.e. real monkeys and monkey pictures can be referred to with 
the word “monkey”). Previous research has debated over the cues that direct picture naming 
in typically developing (TD) children. One possibility is that children simply label shape, 
without reflecting on factors that are external to the perceptible image (i.e. if an image is 
shaped like a cat, it is “a cat”; Browne & Woolley, 2001; Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 
1995). Alternatively, children might label pictures according to artists’ referential intentions 
(i.e. a picture is “a cat” only if it was created with the intention of representing a cat; Bloom 
& Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998; Hartley & Allen, 2014). Our research has two 
primary aims:  we investigate the influence of intention reading on picture interpretation in 
TD children aged 2-5 years, and also examine how children with intention monitoring 
difficulties derive meaning from pictures.  Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
have great difficulty understanding the mental states of others (Allen, 2009; Baron-Cohen, 
Baldwin & Crowson, 1997; Charman et al.,1997; Griffin, 2002; Hartley & Allen, 2014; 
Hobson, 2002), therefore studying this population can provide additional evidence for the 
role of intention reading in typical pictorial understanding and highlight potential differences 
in their processing. 
Several studies have investigated whether TD children reflect on referential intentions 
when naming pictures. Browne and Woolley (2001) showed 4- to 7-year-old TD children and 
adults a puppet show in which the protagonist announced his intention to draw a bear, but 
actually produced a picture that resembled a rabbit. Subsequently, the majority of each age 
group named the picture according to its shape (e.g. a rabbit) rather than the artist’s stated 
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intention (e.g. a bear). This finding suggests that, when viewing images that are sufficiently 
recognisable, TD children assign labels based on shape rather than intentions. However, by 
employing pictures that unambiguously resemble familiar nameable objects other than their 
intended referents, children are presented with an unusual and confusing test situation. As it 
is extremely irregular to encounter a drawing that is intended to represent X, but uniquely 
resembles Y, participants in these circumstances may disregard the artist’s intentions in an 
attempt to reconcile the conflicting cues. While it is unlikely that an artist would draw one 
object whilst intending to represent something else, it is culturally acceptable to assign 
meaning to ambiguous images (e.g. abstract art, infant scribbles). Indeed, examining how 
children interpret ambiguous pictures can provide a more ecologically valid method of 
assessing the relative importance of resemblance and representational intent to children’s 
picture naming (Hartley & Allen, 2014).  
In their often-cited study, Bloom and Markson (1998) asked TD 3- and 4-year-olds to 
draw pairs of objects that closely resembled each other, such as a balloon and a lollipop. 
Predictably, the pairs of pictures produced by the young children were virtually 
indistinguishable, and thus could not be accurately matched to their original referents based 
on shape alone. Nevertheless, when asked to name their drawings after a distracter task, both 
age groups correctly and consistently discriminated based on their original representational 
intentions. Bloom and Markson (1998) propose that “children might call a picture that looks 
like a bird “a bird” not merely because it looks like a bird, but because its appearance makes 
it likely that it was created with the intent to represent a bird” (p. 203). In other words, TD 
children might name shape only insofar as it provides an index of representation. Gelman and 
Ebeling (1998) tested this theory by directly measuring whether children’s naming of 2-D 
shapes is mediated by whether they are intended to be representational. In their study, TD 2-
and 3-year-olds were shown a series of line drawings roughly shaped like familiar nameable 
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objects (e.g. a kite). Some children were informed that the pictures had been created 
intentionally (e.g. someone painted a picture), while others were told that the pictures had 
been created by accident (e.g. someone spilled some paint). When asked to label the pictures, 
children were more likely to name according to shape when they believed that the images 
were intentional creations, and provided more literal non-symbolic responses (e.g. naming 
materials such as “paint”) when they were made accidentally. Thus, the tendency of TD 
children to name a picture’s shape may be influenced by representational status, which is 
ultimately determined by the intentions of its creator. 
To advance theoretical understanding of how intentions mediate picture 
comprehension in typical development, it is necessary to utilise complementary 
methodologies that tap into conceptual representation over-and-above verbal labelling 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1990). If a TD child believes an ambiguous collection of lines was created 
with the intention of representing a familiar object, asking them to draw that stimuli may lead 
to the depiction of additional details that correspond with the symbolised referent. Increasing 
the level of picture-referent resemblance could be taken as further confirmation that the child 
genuinely regards the image to be a symbol, despite the relatively low degree of iconicity.  
Conversely, if a different child believes that the same collection of lines was created by 
accident, and infers it to be non-representational, their graphic reproduction might be more 
faithful to the perceived stimuli.  
Potentially independent of an intentionality effect, children’s graphic copies of 
ambiguous shapes might be influenced by their own verbal labelling. Previous research 
investigating TD children’s drawing of objects has shown that they selectively represent 
different details depending on its designated label (Krascum, Tregenza & Whitehead, 1996; 
Lewis, Russel & Berridge, 1993; Pickard & Vinter, 1999). For example, Lewis, Russell and 
Berridge (1993) asked 5-year-olds to draw a tankard from an unusual perspective (its handle 
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was occluded), after it was called “a mug”, “a glass” or “this”. They found that children 
depicted the occluded handle in 69% of “mug” trials, 48% of “this” trials and 27% of “glass” 
trials. It was likely that the labels “mug” and “glass” directed children’s attention away from 
the perceived stimuli, and towards conceptual knowledge about the object referents of the 
labels (Toomela, 2002). As TD children are highly aware of others as attentional and 
intentional agents (e.g. Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & 
Biro, 1995), they might be more likely to name and canonically represent ambiguous figures 
that they judge to be intentional, rather than accidental, creations. However, it is possible that 
children who assign object names to accidentally created figures may also produce 
increasingly canonical graphic copies, suggesting that egocentric verbal labelling can 
influence children’s drawings in the absence of inferred communicative intentions. 
If intention reading is an important component of children’s picture comprehension, 
we might expect to observe important differences in children with ASD. ASD is a pervasive 
neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterised by profound social-cognitive deficits 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Frith, 2003; 
Kanner, 1943). Many children with ASD have great difficulty understanding the mental states 
of others, including their intentions (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; 
Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996). Deficits in intention reading permeate 
numerous aspects of autistic development, including children’s understanding of goal-
directed actions (D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; Hartley & Allen, 2014), word-referent 
mapping (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005) and picture-object mapping 
(Allen, 2009; Hartley & Allen, 2014). For example, in their recent paper, Hartley and Allen 
(2014) reported that minimally-verbal children with ASD do not reflect on artists’ intentions 
when mapping pictures to objects. While TD toddlers related abstract pictures to intended 
referents they did not resemble, children with ASD mapped the same pictures to non-intended 
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referents they happened to resemble. However, it is not yet known whether functionally 
verbal children with ASD consider representational intentions when naming pictures created 
by others. Furthermore, if children with ASD do not intuitively reflect on pictures as 
creations of other humans with psychological relations to the world (Hartley & Allen, 2014), 
the appearance of their graphic copies may not be related to whether figures are intentional or 
accidental creations. Rather, their drawings may be influenced more by their own verbal 
labelling, perhaps indicating an egocentric style of picture comprehension.  
The objective of this study was to examine the influence of representational intentions 
on children’s picture comprehension. This was achieved by comparing two age groups of TD 
children (2- to 3-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds) and a sample of children with ASD. It is 
well-documented that children with ASD have difficulty understanding the intentions of 
others, and differences in their pattern of performance may serve to reinforce the role of 
intention reading abilities in normative pictorial understanding. The younger TD age group 
was selected based on the success of 2- and 3-year-olds in Gelman and Ebeling (1998), and 
the older group (4- to 5-year-olds) was included to capture age-related changes in productive 
and representational drawing abilities which surface between 3- and 5-years (Cox, 2005; 
Jolley, Knox, & Foster, 2000; Luquet, 2001; Toomela, 1999). It is also possible that the 
continued refinement of intention reading skills during this developmental period (see 
Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998; Wellman & Phillips, 
2001) may impact on how referential intent directs naming and drawing, making it important 
to directly compare the responses of younger and older TD children.  
 All participants were shown a series of line drawings roughly shaped like familiar 
nameable objects. Half the children in each group were informed that the pictures had been 
created intentionally, and half were informed that the pictures had been created accidentally. 
At test, children were asked to name the pictures, and then to draw them. Children’s drawings 
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were coded based on the degree to which they resembled the symbolised intended referent or 
the perceived stimulus. As in Gelman and Ebeling (1998), we predicted that the shape-based 
naming of both TD groups would be influenced by whether the ambiguous figures were 
created intentionally, and thus inferred to be symbolic. Hence, we expected a high rate of 
shape naming responses in the Intentional Condition, and a reduced rate of shape naming 
responses (balanced by an increase in non-symbolic material responses, such as “paint”) in 
the Accidental Condition. We expected that the graphic reproductions of TD children could 
be influenced by 3 factors: chronological age, representational intentions, and children’s prior 
naming. Independent of other factors, we expected to observe an increase in the frequency of 
faithful drawings with age, as children begin to draw in an increasingly realistic manner 
(Luquet, 2001; Cox, 1992, 2005; Golomb, 2002, 2004; Jolley, 2010). Regarding 
representational intentions, we expected that intentionally-created stimuli would elicit an 
increase in the proportion of canonical representations of symbolised referents, while non-
symbolic accidentally-created stimuli would elicit a relative increase in faithful 
reproductions. Lastly, we expected that children’s naming of shape could induce the creation 
of more canonical reproductions of stimuli, independent of representational intentions (e.g. 
they may produce canonical drawings of accidental stimuli if they named its shape).  
For children with ASD, we predicted that children’s symbolic naming and graphic 
copying of ambiguous shapes would not be mediated by artists’ representational intentions. 
Also, while their copying might not be influenced by artists’ intentions, it could be related to 
their own egocentric labelling. If so, they should be more likely to produce canonical 
representations after providing symbolic shape-based labels, and faithful representations after 
providing non-symbolic material labels. Overall, this study will advance understanding of the 
relation between intention reading and picture comprehension by assessing whether 2- to 5-
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year-old TD children are sensitive to artists’ intentions when naming and copying ambiguous 
figures, and by providing converging evidence that children with ASD are not.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants were 32 TD 2- and 3-year-olds (17 males, 15 females; M age = 3;1, 
range: 2;1–3;11, SD = 0;7), 32 TD 4- and 5-year-olds (16 males, 16 females; M age = 4;11, 
range = 4;0–5;9, SD = 0;6), and 20 children with ASD (19 males, 1 female; M age = 9;8, 
range = 4;11–16;2, SD = 3;5) recruited from mainstream schools, specialist schools, nurseries 
and preschools in Kendal and Preston, UK. Children with ASD were diagnosed by a qualified 
educational or clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview - Revised; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & 
Risi, 2002; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) and expert judgment.  ASD diagnoses were 
confirmed via the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis & 
Daly, 1980), which was completed by each participant’s class teacher (M score: 38.75, range: 
31.5–51.5). Each participant’s receptive vocabulary was measured by the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997), an instrument that is 
commonly used to assess children aged 3-years and older.1 Mean receptive vocabulary age-
equivalent scores for the 3 groups were as follows: 3;7 for TD 2- and 3-year-olds (range: 2;0–
5;10, SD = 0;11), 5;6 for TD 4- and 5-year-olds (range: 3;1–8;2, SD = 1;3), and 4;3 for 
children with ASD (range: 2;0–6;5, SD = 1;2). A one-way ANOVA revealed significant 
group differences in receptive language ability, F(2, 81) = 26.47, MSE = 176.49, p < .001, η2 
= .65; the 4- and 5-year-olds had greater ability than the other two groups (p < .001), and 
there was a borderline difference for greater ability in the ASD group relative to the TD 2- 
                                                          
1 The BPVS score of one child with autism was marginally below the lowest raw score with a 
standardised age equivalent (of 2;3). Consequently, we conservatively assigned this child a 




and 3-year-olds (p = .067). In order to assess the effect of ASD on the relation between 
children’s verbal and drawing responses, children with ASD were group matched to a subset 
of TD participants on receptive language ability (see analyses of drawing responses).  All 
children with ASD were functionally verbal, and thus able to name pictures as required.  
Half of the children in each group were randomly assigned to the Intentional 
Condition and half to the Accidental Condition. TD 2- and 3-year-olds in the two conditions 
did not differ on chronological age or receptive language. This was also true for the TD 4- 
and 5-year-olds. Children with ASD in the two conditions did not differ on chronological age, 
receptive language or CARS score. 
2.2 Materials 
The stimuli were four black-and-white pictures (see Fig. 1) selected from Gelman and 
Ebeling’s (1998) Study 2. As children were required to draw each picture, we reasoned that 
more than 4 items would be too demanding for participants in a single session. The drawings 
were scanned from the original article and made approximately 4 times larger. The digital 
stimuli were printed by a high-quality laser printer and laminated. Each drawing had two 
accompanying stories – one per condition. These were identical to those used in the original 
study, except for a small number of cultural adjustments (e.g. replacing ‘art class’ with ‘art 
lesson’). In one story, it was suggested that the picture had been created intentionally. In the 
other story, it was suggested that the same picture had been created accidentally. As in the 
original study, the target picture was said to have been created using the same material in 
both stories. See Appendix A for a full listing of the stories. 
     The participants drew the pictures using a selection of coloured felt-tip pens and crayons 



















































Figure 1. Stimuli and sample drawing responses; a) stimuli “man”, b) representational man, 
c) faithful man, d) stimuli “face”, e) representational face, f) faithful face, g) stimuli “sun”, h) 
representational sun, i) faithful sun, j) stimuli “kite”, k) representational kite, l) faithful kite. 
b) c) a) 
e) f) d) 
h) i) g) 




Participants were tested individually in their own schools and were always 
accompanied by a familiar adult. They were seated at a table next to or opposite the 
experimenter and the materials were placed within their reach.  Children were reinforced 
throughout the session for attention and good behaviour, but the experimenter never indicated 
whether their responses were correct or incorrect.  
 Children received either the Intentional Condition or the Accidental Condition. Both 
conditions consisted of 4 trials. At the start of each trial, the experimenter read aloud a brief 
story explaining how a fictional character had created a picture intentionally or accidentally 
(dependent on condition). The corresponding picture was then presented and the 
experimenter asked, “what is this?” If the participant responded with “I don’t know”, one 
additional prompt was provided. After their response had been recorded, the experimenter 
presented the participant with a sheet of white A4 paper and a packet of colouring pens and 
asked, “can you draw this?” Once the participant had finished drawing, the paper was 
removed from sight by the experimenter. The order in which the four items were presented 
was counterbalanced between participants.  
2.4 Coding 
2.4.1 Verbal responses. Following Gelman and Ebeling’s (1998) scheme, the verbal 
responses of children were coded as belonging to one of four mutually-exclusive categories: 
a) ‘Shape’ – the child named an object that was not mentioned in the experimenter’s 
story, and that corresponded to the shape of the picture (e.g. “a gingerbread man”, “a kite”, “a 
face”, “a sun”). This response indicated that the child regarded the picture as a symbol. 
b) ‘Material’ – the child named the material that the picture had supposedly been 
made from (e.g. “paint”, “mud”, “string”) or referred to it in non-symbolic terms (e.g. “a 
splat”). This response indicated that the child did not regard the picture as a symbol. 
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c) ‘Do Not Know’ – the child indicated that they did not know what the picture was, 
or simply did not respond. 
d) ‘Other’ – the child mentioned physical resemblance (e.g. “it looks like a x”) or 
provided the name of an object/material that was not mentioned in the experimenter’s story 
nor corresponded to the shape of the picture (e.g. “kangaroo”). 
2.4.2 Drawing responses. After labelling each ambiguous figure, children were asked 
to create their own graphic copy. Coding schemes were created that enabled raters to 
categorise children’s reproductions of each figure as either Representational (drawing more 
closely resembled the symbolised referent than the stimuli), Faithful (drawing more closely 
resembled the stimuli than the symbolised referent) or Uncodable (drawing resembled neither 
the stimuli nor the symbolised referent). The coding schemes included a list of key features, 
and coders judged according to criteria whether or not a child’s drawing reproduced each 
feature in either a faithful or canonical fashion. This coding method yielded two scores per 
drawing (each out of 5) reflecting how Representational/Faithful it was. Drawings were 
categorised based on which score – Representational or Faithful – was higher (i.e. if more 
features were represented canonically than faithfully, a drawing was categorised as 
Representational; see Fig. 1 for example drawings). Not all features were weighted equally – 
for each ambiguous figure a key detail was identified that served as a clear indicator of 
whether a child’s drawing was a Representational or Faithful reproduction (e.g. drawing the 
“mouth” of the face-like picture as a horizontal line curving upwards at both ends, as children 
tend to represent smiles, versus drawing a row of individual circular shapes as displayed in 
the stimuli), and this feature was allocated more Representational/Faithful points. An 
example coding scheme (for the ambiguous figure resembling ‘a man’) is described below 
(all coding schemes are documented in Appendix B). 
Example coding scheme - Man 
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1. ‘Uncodable’ – drawing does not share perceptual similarity with either stimuli or 
symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed disconnected 
shapes). If the drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, proceed with 
coding.  
If not Uncodable: 
2. ‘Head’ 
a) Enclosed circular shape located at the top of the drawing. May be attached to a central 
shape or a vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) A single “protrusion” extends upwards from a centre point and is not individuated or 
enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
3. ‘Arms’ 
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend outwards from the sides of a 
central shape or a vertical line (one either side of centre). Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) Two protrusions extend outwards (one each side) of a central mass and neither are 
individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
4. ‘Legs’ 
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend downwards from the bottom of a 
central shape or vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) Two protrusions extend downwards from the bottom of a central mass and neither are 
individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
5. ‘Face’ 
a) Drawing includes internal detail resembling a facial configuration (i.e. 2 eyes, nose and 
mouth). Detail must be located either in enclosed ‘head’ at the top of the drawing, or in the 
central shape if no ‘head’ is present. Score: 2 Representational points. 
b) Drawing does not contain any internal detail. Score: 2 Faithful points.  
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2.4.3 Reliability. Every drawing was coded by the first experimenter and an 
independent rater with related postgraduate experience. The second rater was blind to the 
objectives of the experiment and the details of each artist (e.g. their age, experimental 
condition, whether or not they named the stimuli). Reliability of coding schemes was 
assessed via Cohen’s Kappa, which was calculated based on the two raters’ categorical 
classifications (i.e. whether a drawing was Representational, Faithful or Uncodable). High 
interrater reliability was achieved for all coding schemes (man: к = .83, p < .001; face: к = 
.92, p < .001; sun: к = .83, p < .001; kite: к = .84, p < .001). Disagreements in categorical 
classifications (e.g. Faithful vs. Uncodable) were resolved by consensus between the two 
raters.  
3. Results  
 Two sets of analyses were conducted. The first set addresses children’s verbal 
responses. In order to identify age-related differences in typical development and identify the 
impact of ASD, the two groups of TD children and children with ASD were directly 
compared. The second set focuses on children’s drawing responses, and their relation to 
verbal responding and experimental condition. Here we conduct two Generalized Linear 
Mixed-effects Models – one incorporating the effect of chronological age on the responses of 
TD children, and another comparing the responses of children with ASD and a subset of TD 
participants matched on receptive language. 
3.1 Verbal responses 
All responses could be unambiguously allocated to one of the coding categories 
detailed above. For every child, the number of responses (out of 4) belonging to each 




Table 1. Verbal responses of TD 2- and 3-year-olds, TD 4- and 5-year-olds, and children 
with ASD in the Intentional and Accidental Conditions. 
  Verbal response (SD) 
Group Condition Shape M Material M Do Not Know M Other M 
TD 2- & 3-
year-olds 
Intentional 3.44 (0.73) 0.44 (0.63) 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.25) 
Accidental 1.88 (1.2) 1.93 (1.34) 0.06 (0.25) 0.13 (0.34) 
TD 4- and 5-
year-olds 
Intentional 3.5 (0.73) 0.5 (0.73) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Accidental 2.06 (1.29) 1.94 (1.29) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
ASD 
Intentional 2.2 (1.23) 1.6 (1.26) 0.2 (0.42) 0 (0) 
Accidental 2.1 (1.52) 1.7 (1.49) 0.2 (0.63) 0 (0) 
 
 Given the low rates of Do Not Know and Other responses across age groups and 
conditions, these data were omitted from subsequent analyses. The proportion of trials that 
children made Shape responses was calculated, and these proportion data were entered into a 
3(Group: 2- and 3-year-olds, 4- and 5-year-olds, ASD) x 2(Condition: Intentional, 
Accidental) univariate ANOVA. The analyses revealed a significant effect of Condition, F(1, 
78) = 16.29, MSE = .082, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, indicating that children made a significantly 
higher proportion of Shape responses in the Intentional condition than the Accidental 
condition (and therefore made a significantly greater proportion of Material responses in the 
Accidental condition than the Intentional condition). As the Group x Condition interaction 
approached significance, F(2, 78) = 2.66, MSE = 0.82, p = .076, ηp2 = .06, and we had a 
priori expectations that the ASD group would perform differently, we conducted a series of 
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise tests. In the Intentional condition, the proportion of Shape 
responses made by children with ASD was significantly lower than that of the TD 2- and 3-
year olds (p = .004) and the TD 4- and 5-year-olds (p = .005) who did not differ (p = .99), 
F(2, 39) = 7.07, MSE = .048, p = .002, η2 = 0.26. In the Accidental Condition, all three 
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groups produced similar proportions of Shape responses.  Between-condition comparisons 
showed that the TD 2- and 3-year-olds, F(1, 30) = 16.43, MSE = .07, p < .001, η2 = 0.35, and 
TD 4- and 5-year-olds, F(1, 30) = 15.06, MSE = 0.07, p = .001, η2 = 0.33, produced a 
significantly higher proportion of Shape responses in the Intentional condition than the 
Accidental condition, while the responding of children with ASD did not differ between 
conditions. Interestingly, 16 out of 20 children with ASD named shape or material on at least 
3 out of 4 trials. In the Intentional condition, 4 children with ASD showed a bias for symbolic 
shape-based naming, and 4 showed a bias for non-symbolic material responding. In the 
Accidental condition, 5 children with ASD showed a shape naming bias and 3 showed a 
material naming bias. Thus, roughly equivalent numbers of children in each condition 
consistently named shape or material without considering whether stimuli were intended to 
be representational. It is noteworthy that children in the ASD group with shape and material 
naming biases did not differ on chronological age, receptive vocabulary or autism severity.  
 The relationships between group characteristics and picture labelling were also 
assessed. For TD children, neither chronological age nor receptive vocabulary significantly 
correlated with proportion of symbolic Shape responses in either condition. As the preceding 
analyses showed that the verbal labelling of children with ASD was not influenced by 
representational intentions, the Intentional and Accidental conditions were collapsed. For the 
full sample of children with ASD, neither chronological age nor receptive vocabulary 
significantly correlated with proportion of Shape responses.  
3.2 Drawing responses 
As almost every drawing produced by 2-year-olds was classified as Uncodable, these 
responses were omitted from the following analyses. Compared to the older children, it is 
likely that the 2-year-olds’ level of drawing development and/or motor coordination skills 
were insufficient for the task (Jolley, 2010). Thus, the drawings of children aged 3- to 5-years 
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were examined. There were 16 three-year-olds, 16 four-year-olds and 16 five-year-olds.  
Every TD child produced drawings of all 4 ambiguous figures, with the exception of one 3-
year-old in the Accidental condition who did not draw the figure resembling a man. As three 
children with ASD provided verbal responses but refused to make drawings, there was 17 
children in the ASD group (M age: 10;3, SD: 3;4, M BPVS age: 4;6, SD: 1;1). One child with 
ASD in the Accidental condition refused to draw the figure resembling a man. 
All drawing responses were categorised as Representational, Faithful or Uncodable. 
For every child, the number of responses (out of 4) belonging to each category was calculated 
(see Table 2). Our objective was to identify whether the creation of Representational and 
Faithful drawings was influenced by experimental condition (Intentional, Accidental), 
children’s prior verbal labelling (Shape, Material), chronological age (for the TD children 
only) or diagnosis (TD vs ASD). To determine which combination of effects and interactions 
among these variables provides the best fit to the data, we conducted two sets of Generalized 
Linear Mixed-effects Models (GLMMs) – one examining the effects of Age, Condition and 
Verbal Response on the drawings of TD children, and one examining the effects of 
Diagnosis, Condition and Verbal Response on the drawings of children with ASD and an 
ability-matched sub-sample of TD controls. Following Baayen (2008; Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008), both analyses incorporated random effects of participants and stimuli (trial 
type) on intercepts. In including these random intercepts terms, our analyses were specified to 
estimate the effects of theoretical interest while taking into account random variation among 
participants in levels of Representational drawing production or among stimuli in levels of 






Table 2. Average frequencies of drawing responses (out of 4) produced by typically 
developing children and children with ASD in the Intentional and Accidental Conditions 
  Drawing Response (SD) 
Group Condition Representational M Faithful M Uncodable M 
TD 3-year-olds 
Intentional 2.5 (1.41) 0.25 (0.46) 1.25 (1.39) 
Accidental 1.13 (1.13) 0.38 (0.52) 2.37 (1.5) 
TD 4-year-olds 
Intentional 2 (0.53) 1.37 (0.92) 0.63 (1.060 
Accidental 1.80 (0.92) 1.7 (0.53) 0.5 (0.74) 
TD 5-year-olds 
Intentional 1.75 (1.16) 1.88 (1.36) 0.37 (1.06) 
Accidental 0.62 (0.52) 3.25 (0.71) 0.13 (0.35) 
ASD 
Intentional 1.5 (1.69) 2 (1.93) 0.38 (0.74) 
Accidental 1.11 (0.78) 1.44 (0.47) 1.44 (1.24) 
 
Note: The values for TD 3-year-olds and children with ASD in the Accidental condition do 
not sum to 4 because one child in each group refused to draw on 1 trial.  
 
3.2.1 TD children. As we were specifically interested in the influence of prior Shape 
and Material naming responses on the production of Representational and Faithful drawings, 
drawings rated as Uncodable and those that were preceded by either a Do Not Know or Other 
verbal response were omitted, leaving 146 drawings (observations) in the analysis. The 
analysis modelled the probability (log odds) of creating a Representational drawing, 
considering variation across participants and trial type (random effects), as well as the fixed 
effects of Age in months (continuous variable), Condition (dichotomous variable), and 
Verbal Response (dichotomous variable), plus interactions between these variables.  
We stepped through a series of GLMMs that estimated the impact of Age and 
experimental Condition on the log odds of drawings being Representational (more 
perceptually similar to the symbolised referent). Note that in each model, all fixed effects 
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were entered simultaneously. Model 1 was a “null model” containing only the random effects 
of participants and stimuli on intercepts. Model 2 added main effects of Age, Condition and 
Verbal Response. Model 3 then added both Age x Condition and Age x Verbal Response 
interactions. Model 4 included the Age x Condition x Verbal Response interaction. By 
comparing simpler models (e.g. a model with just main effects) with more complex models 
(e.g. a model with main effects and interactions) we are able to examine if the increased 
complexity associated with additional terms improved the capacity of the model to fit the 
observed responses. We evaluated the relative utility of each increment in model complexity 
using likelihood ratio tests (see Baayen, 2008 and Snijders & Bosker, 2012, for examples). 
These indicated that inclusion of the main effects in Model 2 yielded a significant 
improvement in fit over the null model, χ2 (3) = 40.59, p = 8 x10-9, but adding the two-way 
(Model 3; p = .96) or three-way (Model 4; p = .22) interactions did not improve fit. Thus, 
Model 2 provided the most parsimonious explanation of the observed data (see Table 3). 
 
 Table 3. Summary of the Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Model of (log odds) 
Representational drawing in typically developing children as predicted by Age (months), 
Condition (Intentional, Accidental) and Verbal Response (Shape naming, Material naming); 
note that the Accidental condition and Material verbal response are taken as reference levels 
Fixed effects Estimated coefficient Std. error Z Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 8.33 1.8 4.62 <.001*** 
Age (months)  - 0.16 0.03 -5.14 <.001*** 
Condition (Intentional) 1.23 0.43 2.87 0.004** 
Verbal Response (Shape 
naming) 
0.3 0.49 0.65 0.52 
Random effects Variance Std. Dev   
Subject effect  <0.0001 <0.0001   
Trial type 0.46 0.68   
 AIC BIC logLik deviance 




 In line with our hypotheses, the results demonstrate that TD children’s graphic 
copying of ambiguous pictures is influenced by chronological age and whether or not they are 
created intentionally. TD children were more likely to produce perceptually accurate Faithful 
drawings with age. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 clearly show that 3-year-olds 
produced higher frequencies of Representational drawings than Faithful drawings, whereas 5-
year-olds produced higher frequencies of Faithful drawings than Representational drawings. 
The model also revealed that the Intentional Condition elicited a significant increase in the 
probability of creating Representational drawings, indicating that children’s sensitivity to 
artists’ intentions influences the nature of their graphic copies. Interestingly, the model did 
not identify a predictive relationship between children’s verbal and drawing responses. 
However, the fact that the Age x Condition interaction introduced in Model 3 did not 
significantly improve fit is puzzling given the distribution of Representational and Faithful 
drawings produced by the TD children. Table 2 shows that 3-year-olds produced almost 
exclusively Representational drawings in both conditions, the 4-year-olds produced roughly 
similar frequencies of Representational and Faithful drawings in both conditions, and the 5-
year-olds produced the hypothesised pattern (i.e. relatively more Representational drawings 
in the Intentional condition vs the Accidental condition, and relatively more Faithful 
drawings in the Accidental condition vs the Intentional condition). Indeed, when these age 
groups are analysed separately, the relation between Condition and Drawing is significant for 
5-year-olds, X2 (2, N = 60) = .7.16, p = .007, but not 3-year-olds (Fisher’s Exact = .59, non-
sig.) or 4-year-olds (X2= .73, p = .79). Thus, contrary to the model’s output, the relation 
between Condition and Drawing Response actually differs between age groups – only the 5-
year-olds’ drawings were significantly influenced by artists’ representational intentions. By 
contrast, separate analyses for each age group examining the relation between Verbal 
Responding and Drawing Responding yielded no differences. 
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Finally, to establish whether the drawings of the TD children differed in quality across 
age groups or experimental conditions, the frequencies of Uncodable responses were entered 
into a 3(Group: 2- and 3-year-olds, 4- and 5-year-olds, ASD) x 2(Condition: Intentional, 
Accidental) univariate ANOVA. The analyses revealed a main effect of Group, F(2, 42) = 
8.97, MSE = .10.65, p = .001, ηp2 = .3, indicating that 3-year-olds made significantly more 
Uncodable drawing responses than 4- and 5-year-olds, who did not differ (see Table 2). There 
was no effect of Condition and no interaction, suggesting that differences in the frequencies 
of Uncodable drawings between the Intentional and Accidental condition were not significant 
for any age group. 
3.2.2 ASD vs. TD. To assess whether the responding of children with ASD was 
qualitatively atypical, it was necessary to include both populations within the same model. As 
the receptive language ability of children with ASD who produced drawings fell between that 
of the TD 3- and 4-year-olds, we created a control group consisting of the 8 3-year-olds (4 
per condition) who scored highest on the BPVS and the 8 4-year-olds (4 per condition) who 
scored lowest. The mean receptive vocabulary age for this TD control group was 4;6 years 
(SD = 0;8) and was very well matched to the ASD group (M = 4;6, SD = 1;1). 
As in the preceding analysis, drawings rated as Uncodable and those that were 
preceded by either a Do Not Know or Other verbal response were omitted, leaving 91 
drawings (observations) in the analysis. The analysis modelled the probability (log odds) of 
creating a Representational drawing, considering variation across participants and trial type 
(random intercepts), as well as fixed effects of diagnostic Group (dichotomous variable), 
Condition (dichotomous variable) and Verbal Response (dichotomous variable), plus 
interactions between these variables. 
We conducted a sequence of GLMMs that estimated the impact of Group and 
experimental Condition on the log odds of drawings being Representational. Note that in each 
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model, all fixed effects were entered simultaneously. Model 1 was a “null model” containing 
only the random effects of subject and trial. Model 2 added main effects of Group, Condition 
and Verbal Response. Model 3 then added both Group x Condition and Group x Verbal 
Response interactions. Model 4 included the Group x Condition x Verbal Response 
interaction. 
As above, we evaluated the relative utility of each increasingly-complex model using 
likelihood ratio tests. These indicated that inclusion of the main effects in Model 2 yielded a 
significant improvement in fit over the null model, χ2 (3) = 18.41, p < .001, and adding the 
two-way interactions in Model 3 improved the fit further, χ2 (2) = 10.06, p = .006. The 
addition of the three-way interaction (Model 4; p = .59) afforded no further improvement. 
Therefore, Model 3 provides the best fitting explanation of the observed data (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Summary of the Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Model of (log odds) 
Representational drawing in children with autism and language-matched controls as predicted 
by Group (ASD, TD), Condition (Intentional, Accidental) and Verbal Response (Shape 
naming, Material naming); note that the ASD group, Accidental condition and Material 
verbal response are taken as reference levels 
Fixed effects Estimated coefficient Std. error Z Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -1.98 0.95 -2.08 0.037* 
Group (TD)  1.17 1.28 0.92 0.36 
Condition (Intentional) -1.09 1.01 -1.08 0.28 
Verbal Response (Shape naming) 3.65 1.25 2.93 0.003** 
Group (TD) x Condition (Intentional) 3.55 1.56 2.28 0.022* 
Group (TD) x Verbal Response 
(Shape naming) 
-2.84 1.65 -1.73 0.08 (borderline) 
Random effects Variance Std. Dev   
Subject effect  0.88 0.94   
Trial type 0.07 0.27   
 AIC BIC logLik deviance 




In support of our hypotheses, the GLMM suggests that children with ASD are less 
sensitive to representational intentions when copying ambiguous pictures. That is, being 
asked to draw meaningful communicative symbols in the Intentional Condition did not elicit 
the same increase in Representational drawings as for the TD comparison group. This is 
evident in the descriptive statistics (see Table 2) which show that children with ASD 
produced roughly similar frequencies of Representational and Faithful drawings in both 
conditions. However, compared with TD children, it appears that children with ASD tend to 
produce more Representational drawings after naming shape (borderline interaction, p = .08). 
Thus, for the ASD group, children’s own verbal labelling had a greater influence on their 
drawings than the artists’ underlying intentions. Together with the preceding analyses, these 
results indicate the opposite pattern of performance for TD children – their drawings were 
influenced more by representational intentions (they were more likely to produce 
Representational drawings in the Intentional Condition and Faithful drawings in the 
Accidental Condition) than their prior verbal labelling. 
To identify whether the drawings of the ASD group differed in quality between 
experimental conditions, the frequencies of Uncodable responses were entered into an 
independent-samples t-test (Condition was the between-subjects factor). The t-test bordered 
on significance, t(15) = -2.13, p = .051, d = 1.04, suggesting that children with ASD tended to 
produce more Uncodable drawing responses in the Accidental condition than the Intentional 
condition. 
To clarify the influence of prior verbal responding on the drawings of children with 
ASD, we examined the response patterns of children previously identified as having a shape 
or material naming bias.2 Within this sub-sample, each trial was assigned to one of 6 
categories depending on the child’s corresponding verbal (Shape, Material) and drawing 
                                                          




(Representational, Faithful, Uncodable) responses (see Table 5). Children with a shape 
naming bias produced Representational drawings on 45% of trials and Faithful drawings on 
29% of trials, while children with a material naming bias produced Faithful drawings on 45% 
of trials and Representational drawings on 25% of trials. More importantly, across the entire 
sample of children with ASD, significantly more trials including codable drawings fit the 
hypothesised verbal-drawing predictive relationship (i.e. Shape-Representational, Faithful-
Material; N = 37), than did not (i.e. Shape-Faithful, Material-Representational; N= 12), X2 (1, 
N = 49) = 12.76, p < .001. By contrast, when we consider the influence of representational 
intentions on the entire sample of children with ASD, similar frequencies of trials including 
codable drawings fit the hypothesised condition-drawing predictive relationship (i.e. 
Intentional-Representational, Accidental-Faithful; N = 26) as did not (i.e. Intentional-Faithful, 
Accidental-Representational; N = 23). Thus, it is clear that the prior verbal labelling of 
children with ASD influences their subsequent drawing of ambiguous pictures, but artists’ 
representational intentions do not.    
 
Table 5.  Patterns of naming and drawing responses by children with ASD identified as 
having a shape or material naming bias. 
Bias S-R S-F S-U M-R M-F M-U 
Shape 
naming 14 (45%) 6 (19%) 6 (19%) 0 (0%) 3 (10%) 2 (6%) 
Material 
naming 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 0 3 (15%) 8 (40%) 6 (30%) 
 
Note: S-R: Shape-Representational; S-F: Shape-Faithful; S-U: Shape-Uncodable; M-R: 






The present study investigated whether children’s naming and drawing of pictures is 
influenced by representational status, as determined by an artist’s intentions. TD children 
aged 2- to 5-years and children with ASD were shown a series of line drawings roughly 
shaped like familiar nameable objects, and were informed that the figures had been created 
intentionally or by accident. At test, participants were asked to name the pictures, and then 
draw them. Our results indicate that picture comprehension in TD children is not mediated 
exclusively by shape. In the Intentional condition, all TD children produced significantly 
higher proportions of symbolic naming responses than non-symbolic material responses, but 
in the Accidental condition, these responses were produced at similar rates. Hence, our data 
support the theory that, from 2-years of age, TD children reliably name shape only when it 
provides an index of representational intent (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 
1998). By contrast, children with ASD were equally likely to label shape or material 
irrespective of whether ambiguous figures were intentional representations. The drawing data 
indicated that graphic copying in TD children is mediated by chronological age and, by 5 
years, the representational intentions underlying the to-be-copied figure. While the TD 
children produced more Faithful drawings with age, the Intentional Condition elicited an 
increase in Representational drawings (canonical depictions of symbolised referents) in the 
eldest group. Interestingly, the drawings of the ASD group were influenced by children’s 
own verbal labelling.  Overall, these findings suggest that representational intentions mediate 
how TD children, but not children with ASD, name and copy pictures.  
In line with previous evidence (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998), 
our data show that young TD children reflect on whether 2-D markings are intended to be 
representational before assigning an object name based on shape. When such markings are 
created by accident, they often regard them as non-symbolic, and can refrain from naming 
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shape. The observed effect of representational status replicates Gelman and Ebeling’s (1998) 
findings almost perfectly, and supports Bloom and Markson’s (1998) claim that TD children 
name shape when they infer it to be a reliable cue to referential intent (e.g. children are much 
more likely to name a car-shaped drawing “a car” than a car-shaped paint spill). Thus, at a 
theoretical level, this study demonstrates that TD children do not always name the shapes of 
pictures – they name the referents that those shapes are intended to represent. Conversely, our 
study argues against Browne and Woolley (2001) who propose that children’s picture 
comprehension is entirely resemblance-based. It is noteworthy that their study employed 
pictures that unambiguously resembled familiar nameable objects other than their intended 
referents, thus presenting participants with an unusual and confusing test situation.  This 
problem is avoided here by using ambiguous pictures; while each figure resembled a familiar 
nameable object, the degree of iconicity was low enough for it to be believable that 
resemblance could be incidental. Consequently, children in the Accidental Condition, who 
experienced conflict between shape and representational status, were not biased towards 
shape-based naming.  
As predicted, and in accord with previous descriptions of children’s drawing 
development (Cox, 1992, 2005; Golomb, 2002, 2004; Jolley, 2010; Luquet, 2001), TD 
children showed an age-related transition from drawing what they know to drawing what they 
see when reproducing ambiguous figures. Irrespective of condition, TD 3-year-olds produced 
high frequencies of Representational and Uncodable drawings, but very low frequencies of 
Faithful drawings, while the 4-year-olds produced similar frequencies of Representational 
and Faithful drawings, and the 5-year-olds produced high frequencies of Faithful drawings. 
There are several possible explanations for these age differences. Firstly, the performance of 
the 3-year-olds could be attributable to differences in their freehand drawing and copying 
skills. Each of the pictures represented a familiar object that young children often practice 
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drawing (person, face, sun, kite), thus when the 3-year-olds regarded the stimuli as symbols, 
they could produce Representational responses by activating well-practiced drawing scripts 
and adopting a ‘content-directed’ strategy (Chen & Cook, 1984). However, when the stimuli 
were perceived as non-symbolic, their attempts to produce Faithful reproductions were likely 
hindered by their insufficient graphic copying skills, resulting in high frequencies of 
Uncodable drawings (particularly in the Accidental condition). By contrast, the 4- and 5-year-
produced far fewer Uncodable responses and increasing frequencies of Faithful drawings, 
indicating their more advanced graphic copying skills and increasing use of a ‘structure-
directed’ strategy focussing primarily on the to-be-copied image, rather than the symbolised 
referent (Chen & Cook, 1984).  
Secondly, the drawing responses of TD children may have been influenced by their 
judgements about the experimenter’s expectations. When the 3-year-olds were assigned the 
goal of reproducing an image of a familiar object, their primary concern may have been to 
create a drawing that was clearly recognisable to the experimenter, thus necessitating the 
inclusion of category-defining features associated with the label (Bremner & Moore, 1984). 
By contrast, the 5-year-olds may have been increasingly focussed on producing perceptually 
accurate copies, even when they regarded the ambiguous figures as symbols for familiar, 
nameable, objects. Finally, the drawings of the TD children may have been influenced by 
their comprehension of the test question “can you draw this?” (Freeman, 1991; Cox, 1992). 
The youngest children may have taken the word this to mean the symbolised object (i.e. “can 
you draw a kite?” or “can you draw what you see in this picture?”), while the older children 
may have interpreted the question more literally (i.e. “can you draw this specific picture?”). 
While it is impossible for us to quantify the relative contribution of each potential influence 
on the TD children’s drawings, our findings indicate a clear age-related shift in how young 
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TD children reproduce ambiguous pictures – they initially focus on representing symbolic 
content, but increasingly focus on preserving perceptual accuracy.   
Alongside the effect of age, the graphic copies of TD children were influenced by 
representational intent, but not their own verbal labelling. The GLME model indicated that 
the TD children were relatively more likely to produce Representational drawings in the 
Intentional condition, and Faithful drawings in the Accidental condition. However, when the 
relation between Condition and Drawing Response was analysed separately for each age 
group, only the 5-year-olds’ drawings were significantly influenced by representational 
intentions. By effectively drawing the referents that shapes were intended to represent, rather 
than the shapes themselves, children provided converging evidence that they derive 
referential meaning from artists’ intentions. However, the fact that even 2- and 3-year-old TD 
children were sensitive to representational intentions when naming ambiguous shapes 
suggests that the influence of intentions on graphic copying is not straightforward. It is likely 
that an interaction between intentional understanding and drawing ability drove the observed 
age effect. Contrary to our predictions, TD children’s prior verbal labelling did not mediate 
the way they depicted ambiguous figures. This may indicate that even young TD children 
understand that the meaning of a pictorial representation is not determined by the perception 
of the viewer (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008). Furthermore, the 
finding that older children (particularly 5-year-olds) often produced Faithful drawings after 
naming shape could indicate an increasing awareness that artists might intend to create 
abstract or less-iconic pictures, thus directing children to produce perceptually accurate 
copies that conform to those inferred intentions. 
Unlike the TD children, children with ASD were not sensitive to representational 
intentions when naming or drawing ambiguous figures. Regardless of whether a picture was 
created intentionally or by accident, children with ASD were equally likely to perceive it as a 
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symbolic object (naming shape) or a non-symbolic object (naming material). The fact that 
intentionality did not increase shape-based naming in children with ASD suggests that this 
population may not understand that communicative intentions confer symbolic status to 
visual representations. Indeed, over 75% of the ASD consistently named either shape or 
material (bias types were equally frequent in both conditions) without considering whether 
stimuli were intended to be representational. Our finding that the drawings of children with 
ASD were influenced by their verbal responding, rather than representational status, provides 
additional evidence that this population derive meaning from pictures in an egocentric, non-
intentional, manner. Unlike TD 5-year-olds, who created increased proportions of 
Representational drawings in the Intentional Condition (i.e. they drew a more face-like 
picture when they inferred that a figure’s creator had intended to represent a face), children 
with ASD tended to create Representational drawings after naming shape (i.e. they drew a 
more face-like picture when they themselves decided that a figure was a face). However, from 
the current data, it is impossible to distinguish whether the verbal labels or children’s internal 
appraisal of the depicted content was responsible for the relationship between naming and 
drawing responses in the ASD group. For example, it is possible that children with ASD drew 
“a man” because they thought the drawing was “a man”, rather than because they named it a 
“man”. In this scenario, verbal labelling merely serves as an indicator of children’s internal 
appraisal, and is not itself the cause of the canonical drawing.  Future research is required to 
disentangle the relationship between internal judgements of content, verbal labelling and 
drawing by comparing graphic copies created by children before and after naming. Another 
puzzling finding was that children with ASD produced significantly more Uncodable 
drawings in the Accidental condition than the Intentional condition. One possibility is that 
children in the Accidental condition were trying to make the stimuli more perceptually 
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similar to the constituent materials (e.g. more mud-like), however, further work is required to 
validate this speculation. 
Research investigating the acquisition of pictorial understanding has shown that 
social-cognitive skills (e.g. intention reading and imitation) enable TD children to learn about 
pictures through interactions with more experienced symbol-users (Callaghan & Rankin, 
2002; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Callaghan et al., 2004; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005). 
However, many children with ASD show deficits in the social-cognitive skills that underlie 
pictorial development, such as imitation and intention reading (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Charman 
et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996), possibly preventing 
them from inferring representational intentions from others’ communicative actions involving 
pictures. If children with ASD cannot acquire pictorial understanding through social 
interactions, perhaps they develop an understanding of pictures via an alternative non-
intentional pathway (Hartley & Allen, 2014). Moreover, the atypical performance of children 
with ASD in this study provides converging support for the theory that normative picture 
comprehension integrates intention reading processes (at least in certain circumstances). In 
situations where resemblance is an inadequate cue to a 2-D shape’s meaning, it appears that 
young TD children spontaneously reflect on the intentions of its creator to establish (a) 
whether the shape is in fact a symbolic representation (shown by the present study), and (b) 
what the intended referent is (Hartley & Allen, 2014). Conversely, impairments in social-
cognition may inhibit children with ASD from reflecting on intentional cues, perhaps 
eliciting a decontextualized and egocentric interpretation. 
Of course, we must address the limitations of this research. Although the children 
with ASD were matched on receptive language to TD peers, they may not have understood 
the social-pragmatics underlying the stories. However, the stories were worded specifically to 
tap children’s understanding of whether representational intentions confer symbolic status to 
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pictures. If the autism group failed to understand the intentional language, it is highly 
probable that they are not reflecting on pictures as intentional creations of others (Hartley & 
Allen, 2014).  It is also possible that some Material naming responses were due to echolalia – 
the tendency to repeat recently-heard words and phrases. However, the influence of echolalia 
was likely minimal because  (a) more than 50% of verbal responses were shape names, and 
(b) there would have been instances of children echoing other words in the stories (e.g. the 
protagonists name), leading to increased rates of “Other” responses. We acknowledge that the 
atypical responding of the ASD group may have been due to general developmental delay, 
rather than autism per se. Including an ability-matched sample of children with major 
learning disabilities would have enabled us to address this distinction. However, children 
with ASD were included in this study to corroborate the role of intentional reasoning in 
typical picture comprehension, and it should be the objective of future research to elucidate 
the specific origins of their picture comprehension difficulties.   
 It is important to note that the drawing data is less clear-cut and more complex to 
interpret than the naming data due to variation in drawing ability, theory of mind, and 
possible differences in children’s comprehension of the test question. However, the 
responding of TD 5-year-olds and the children with ASD broadly supported our hypotheses 
concerning the influence of representational intentions on children’s graphic copying. As we 
propose that the contrasting response patterns of TD children and children with ASD are 
caused by differences in intention reading, this study would have benefited from an additional 
measure of this ability. Thus, despite the fact that deficits in intention reading are well-
documented in ASD (Allen, 2009; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Charman et al., 1997; 
D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; Griffin, 2002; Hartley & Allen, 2014; Hobson, 2002; Preissler 
& Carey, 2005), our theoretical explanations should be treated with caution. Similarly, it 
would have been valuable to measure participants’ nonverbal ability to test whether this skill 
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contributed to differences in performance, particularly concerning children’s drawing 
responses. The importance of this weakness is reduced by previous evidence that nonverbal 
ability does not significantly predict typical development in the pictorial domain (including 
graphic production; Kirkham, Stewart & Kidd, 2012), therefore limiting its relevance to the 
ASD group only. Lastly, it would have been beneficial to assess whether all participants were 
capable of drawing the stimuli in a canonical fashion. Perhaps some children (particularly in 
the ASD group) produced low frequencies of Representational drawings because they were 
unable to produce iconic drawings of the referent objects. However, all of the depicted 
objects were common referents of children’s free drawings (Cox, 2005), and previous studies 
have shown that the free drawings of children with ASD are at least as iconic as those of 
ability-matched controls (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1993).  
5. Conclusions 
Overall, the present study has shown that representational status significantly 
mediates how TD children, but not children with ASD, name and draw ambiguous pictures. 
The tendency of TD 2- to 5-year-olds to name a picture’s shape is influenced by whether or 
not the artist intended that shape to be representational. Additionally, TD 5-year-olds (but not 
3- or 4-year-olds) were more likely to produce canonical drawings of symbolised referents 
when they believed that stimuli were intended to be symbolic, further demonstrating their 
sensitivity to representational intentions underlying pictures. Thus, picture comprehension in 
typical development is not driven entirely by resemblance – the meaning of a given shape is 
determined by the intentions of its creator. By contrast, the naming and drawing responses of 
children with ASD were not influenced by the social-communicative intentions underlying 
pictures. Rather, impairments in social-cognition may prevent children with ASD from 
spontaneously reflecting on representational intentions, resulting in an egocentric style of 
picture comprehension (Hartley & Allen, 2014). Further research is required to elucidate 
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important differences in the development of pictorial understanding between typically 
developing children and children with ASD. 
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7. Appendix A. Stories corresponding to each ambiguous picture (I = Intentional; A = 
Accidental) (see Fig. 1) 
Picture 1 (man). I: When John was painting in an art lesson, he used some paint to make 
something for his teacher. This is what it looked like. 
A: When John’s dad was painting the house, John accidentally spilled 
some paint on the floor. This is what it looked like. 
Picture 2 (face). I: Tommy had peas with his dinner one night. He didn’t like the way 
they tasted, so he pushed them around on his plate to make a picture. 
This is what it looked like. 
 A: Tommy had peas with his dinner one night. He tried to eat them 
with a fork, but some of them rolled off his fork onto the floor. This is 
what it looked like. 
Picture 3 (sun). I: One day, while he was in an art lesson, Mike got to use mud to make 
an art project. Mike carefully put the mud on the paper until he was 
finished. It looked like this. 
 A: One day, while he was playing, Mike saw a big puddle. Mike 
jumped in the puddle and the mud splashed on his shirt. It looked like 
this. 
Picture 4 (kite). I: While looking through a scrap box, Dave found some string and 
decided to make an art project. It looked like this.  
 A: While walking through his front yard, David found some string 






8. Appendix B. Coding schemes for children’s drawings 
Picture 1 (man). 
1. ‘Uncodable’ – drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either stimuli 
or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed disconnected 
shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, proceed with coding.  
2. ‘Head’ 
a) Enclosed circular shape located at the top of the drawing. May be attached to a central 
shape or a vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) A single “protrusion” extends upwards from a centre point and is not individuated or 
enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
3. ‘Arms’ 
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend outwards from the sides of a 
central shape or a vertical line (one either side of centre). Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) Two protrusions extend outwards (one each side) of a central mass and neither are 
individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
4. ‘Legs’ 
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend downwards from the bottom of a 
central shape or vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) Two protrusions extend downwards from the bottom of a central mass and neither are 
individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
5. ‘Face’ 
a) Drawing includes internal detail resembling a facial configuration (i.e. 2 eyes, nose and 
mouth). Detail must be located either in enclosed ‘head’ at the top of the drawing, or in the 
central shape if no ‘head’ is present. Score: 2 Representational points. 
b) Drawing does not contain any internal detail. Score: 2 Faithful points.  
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Picture 2 (face). 
1. ‘Uncodable’ – drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either stimuli 
or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed disconnected 
shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, proceed with coding.  
2. ‘Eyes/nose’ 
a) Three markings (e.g. combination of circles, ovals, lines and dots) positioned in an 
inverted triangle configuration. If the top two markings are circles, they must include internal 
detail (e.g. dots). Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) Three circles positioned in an inverted triangle configuration. Circles contain no internal 
detail. Score: 1 Faithful point. 
3. ‘Mouth’ 
a) An unbroken line is positioned below the inverted triangle markings. The line curves 
upwards at both ends. Score: 4 Representational points. 
b) An unbroken line is positioned below the inverted triangle markings. The line is flat 
(horizontal). Score: 2 Representational points. 
c) A row of individual, enclosed, rounded shapes or dots are positioned in a row below the 
inverted triangle markings. The row is flat (horizontal). Score: 2 Faithful points. 
d) A row of individual, enclosed, rounded shapes or dots are positioned in a row below he 
inverted triangle markings. The row is horizontal and curves upwards at both ends. Score: 4 
Faithful points. 
 
Picture 3 (sun). 
1. ‘Uncodable’ – drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either stimuli 
or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed disconnected 
shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, proceed with coding.  
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2. ‘Central shape’ 
a) Central shape is uniformly rounded (e.g. circle, oval) with no internal detail or detail 
resembling a facial configuration. Score: 1 Representational point. 
b) Central shape is not smoothly rounded (i.e. it’s “dented”) and contains no internal detail. 
Score: 1 Faithful point. 
3. ‘Outer shapes’ 
a) The outer shapes are wiggly or straight lines that extend outwards from the central shape. 
Score: 4 Representational points. 
b) The majority of the outer shapes are roughly circular and are attached to the central shape. 
Score: 2 Representational points. 
c) The majority of the outer shapes are roughly circular and are detached from the central 
shape. Score: 2 Faithful points. 
d) The majority of the outer shapes are ovals or tear-drops and are detached from the central 
shape. Score: 4 Faithful points. 
 
Picture 4 (kite) 
1. ‘Uncodable’ – drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either stimuli 
or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed disconnected 
shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, proceed with coding.  
2. ‘Kite’ 
a) Drawing includes an enclosed shape that does not have 4 sides (e.g. circle, oval). Must be 
connected to a line extending away/downwards from the shape. Score: 3 Representational 
points. 
b) Drawing includes an enclosed shape that has 4 straight sides. Must be connected to a line 




a) Line extending downwards from enclosed shape is straight. Score: 2 Representational 
points. 
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